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Abstract 
In 1999 the Hordaland County Council decided that the county should introduce so-called ”quality 
contracts” for public transport in the county. The main idea of this type of contract is that decisions on 
the level of service (routes and frequencies) are left to the operators while the fares are subject to 
regulation by the county. A basic ingredient of such contracts should be a remuneration scheme linked 
to the level of service. The purpose of the remuneration is to internalise the impacts on consumers’ 
surplus caused by changes in the level of service. This impact is inadequately captured by the changes 
in fare revenue. Theory gives some guidance with respect to the principle of proper remuneration. A 
model was calibrated for each of the three main bus operators in Hordaland and used to estimate the 
rates of remuneration that would induce the operator to provide an optimum level of service based on 
maximisation of profit.  Modelling indicated that the remuneration schemes should consist for fixed 
rates per revenue kilometre and vehicle hour of revenue service for basic services and additional peak 
services respectively. Due to substantial deviation between fare and marginal cost for peak passengers, 
two operators should also have a remuneration per peak passengers. Modelling also showed that the 
sum of fare revenue and remuneration per km, hour and peak passenger would imply excessive profits 
and that the contracts therefor should include the deduction of a fixed amount. This is a novel and 
promising approach to contracting for public transport services. The heavy reliance on modelling 
means that the stakeholders must have confidence in the model and the results produced.  In year 2000, 
contracts were implemented in the County of Hordaland based on these principles and results from 
modelling.    
 
 
 
Introduction 
Two aspects of public transport makes the industry subject to increasing returns to 
scale irrespective of the economics of scale with respect to firm size.  One aspect is 
due to the economics of vehicle size. Within certain limits the cost of the driver is a 
fixed element when the size or capacity of a unit increases. The other aspect comes 
from the demand side. When demand increases and capacity per route departure 
remains constant, frequencies or route density will increase if the load factor shall 
remain at an optimum level. Thus the average user cost will decrease due to shorter 
waiting times and/or walking distances.  
 
Decreasing average cost makes a classic case for public subsidies and also for a 
situation where a competitive market may fail to produce the “usual” efficiency 
characteristics.  In the absence of efficient road pricing, the case for public subsidies 
is strengthened in urban areas subject to congestion in the road network. This is due to 
the general “second best” argument in welfare theory.  A counteracting force is the 
fact that public funds have a cost due to the distorting effect of high tax rates.  
 
On the other hand, public subsidies and lack of a competitive market raises other 
issues of efficiency, notably X-efficiency in the firms that provide public transport 
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services and market efficiency which is related to the quality and level of service 
provided in public transport. The problem of X-efficiency is clearly relevant for 
public transport operators that are public companies, but private companies exempted 
from competitive pressures may also tend to inflate costs.  This leads to two crucial 
questions: 
 
1. How should a market for public transport be organised? 
2. What is the proper level of subsidies and how shall the subsidies be allocated? 
 
So far no ideal answers seems to have emerged for these two questions and what we 
can observe, at least for local public transport, is a multitude of organisational forms 
and subsidy schemes.  
 
This paper deals with novel approach recently implemented in the County of 
Hordaland on the western coast of Norway termed “incentive contracts” (Carlquist 
2001).   
 
 
The basic idea of the Norwegian “incentive contracts”     
The starting point is that a public transport operator usually has the best and most 
detailed knowledge of the market he serves. A public authority responsible for public 
transport, will hardly be able to match the knowledge of the market possessed by an 
operator. An operator certainly also has a better knowledge of the cost structure for 
public transport services and should be able to accurately assess the cost of adding, 
deleting or changing routes, increasing or decreasing frequencies, changing timetables 
and so forth. Much of the information possessed by an operator familiar with an area 
or region will usually be unavailable for a public authority designing a route system 
that shall be subject to competitive tendering.  Thus it can be argued that the design of 
a route system is best left to an operator familiar with the area to be served.  
 
However, for an operator to design and operate a route system efficiently, the 
“correct” incentives must also be present. The main problem here is the following: 
 
An public transport operator with a purely commercial objective (i.e. maximising 
profit) will look at the marginal trade-off’s between the cost of improving the service 
and the additional fare revenue from improving the service. In a situation without 
proper incentives there are two important elements that will be missing in the 
operator’s assessment: 
 
¾ Existing public transport riders will also benefit from an improved level of 
service due to reduced waiting time, shorter walking distances or a reduced 
number of transfers. This is a parallel to the fact that most of the benefits from 
improving a road system comes from existing road users.     
¾ To the extent that car traffic is “underpriced”, a transfer of riders from car to 
public transport due to an improved level of service will produce additional 
social benefits that are not reflected in the fare revenue from transferred riders.  
 
Thus, a proper system of economic incentives should attempt to internalise these 
benefits in the accounts of the operator.  This is by no means straightforward. What is 
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needed is a remuneration scheme related to some measure of the level of service and 
(possibly) the number of passengers. The level of remuneration must also sufficient to 
make the operator provide an optimum, but not excessive, level of service from a 
social point of view.  
  
Nothing has so far been said about public transport fares. In a geographical area that is 
served by a monopolist public transport operator, it is natural to have a public body 
that regulates the fares. From economic point of view, the fares should ideally 
correspond to marginal cost with proper adjustment for the cost of public funds and – 
if relevant – second best considerations related to underpriced car traffic. In practice 
the level and structure of public transport fares will deviate more or less from the 
principles dictated by economic theory, be it for political or practical reasons. Still, 
irrespective of fares, the level of service remains a vital issue.   
 
 
Modelling as basis for designing incentive schemes  
In our work for Hordaland County one of the main tasks was to come up with 
recommendations with respect to economic incentives. The model used for this work 
was based on an adaptation and re-calibration of a model previously used for similar 
analysis related to the Oslo Public Transport Company (Larsen 1996 and 1999).  
 
This model maximises social surplus for a public transport system with the relevant 
constrains applied to capacity, fares and total amount of subsidies. The model allows 
for inclusion of additional benefits related to transfer of car traffic. Formally it is a 
matter non-linear programming with non-linear constraints. The inclusion of a cost of 
public funds is also provided for.  
 
In the model we distinguish between basic services that are operated with a fixed 
frequency all day and additional – and more costly – services that are provided only in 
peak periods. A model with diurnal peaks that distinguish between a basic (all day) 
service and additional service (higher frequency) in the peak periods was first 
presented by Jansson (1979, 1984). 
 
On the demand side we distinguish between three categories of passengers: 
1. Passengers in peak periods that use the sections of routes where the total need for 
capacity is determined. 
2. Other passengers in peak periods. 
3. Passengers in off-peak periods. 
 
Benefits related to transfer of riders from car to public transport are assumed to be 
relevant only for category 1 passengers.  
    
Practically any improvement in the level service from the passengers’ point of view, 
apart from minor timetable adjustments and improved comfort, will involve an 
increase in revenue kilometres provided. Consequently there is a relatively close 
correspondence between the level of service as experienced by public transport 
passengers in an area and the number revenue kilometres provided per unit of time in 
the area.       
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As a simplification the model is therefor based on the assumption that the demand 
function for the three categories depends on the fare and the number of revenue 
kilometres per hour.   
 
If we use Yi as a symbol for category “i” passengers per hour, XA and XB as symbols 
for revenue kilometres per hour of additional and basic services respectively and qi as 
symbol for average fare for category “i” passengers, the demand functions can be 
written as: 
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The arguments in the cost function are XA, XB, SA, SB and Yi (i=1,2,3). SA and SB are 
average capacity per revenue kilometre.  
 
The cost function can thus in general be put down as: 
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The constraints on capacity can be stated as: 
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There will always be sufficient capacity for passengers in category 2 and no constraint 
is therefor needed for this category.  
 
The model produces results on an annual basis by multiplying the relevant variables 
by the number of hours per year.  
 
In the most general case the model is used to maximise social surplus (SSP) defined 
as: 
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with respect to the 7 variables qi (i=1,2,3), XA, XB, SA and SB and only with the 
constraints on capacity.  CSi is consumers’ surplus for category “i” and B(Y1) is the 
benefits related to transfer for car travellers to public transport.  
 
When B(Y1) ≡0 we get the standard “first best” case with fares equal to marginal cost 
and an optimum level of service. The amount of subsidy (fare revenue less cost) is in 
this case usually close to 40 per cent of cost.  
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The problem of finding proper economic incentives can within the framework of this 
model be stated as follows: 
 
 
Assume that we have found a solution to the problem of maximising social surplus 
with the relevant constraints (which may also involve constraints on fares and total 
amount of subsidy).  Let this solution be {q*, X*,S*} (in vector notation).  
Find estimates of subsidy per passenger (q’) and per revenue kilometre ( t ) such that 
the solution to the problem: 
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is equal or approximately equal to {X*,S*). 
 
That is, find a remuneration scheme for revenue kilometres and (if necessary) 
passengers that will induce a profit maximising operator to provide the socially 
optimal level of service.    
 
It turns out that in all the cases where we applied the model, it has been possible to 
find such estimates {q’,t}. In many cases it has also been possible to find a solution 
with q’ ≡ 0. This is an advantage because it allows for a simpler incentive scheme that 
also is easy to monitor for a public authority.  
 
However, it also turns out that this type of incentive scheme (i.e. a fixed remuneration 
per revenue kilometre for different types of services and – if necessary - combined 
with a fixed remuneration for different categories of passengers) may allow for a 
excessive profit. Thus the schemes must be supplemented by a deduction in the 
subsidies calculated on basis of revenue kilometres and passengers, but this deduction 
should not affect the remuneration “on the margin”.  
 
Economic incentives based on this principle should be a main ingredient in a long 
term contract between a public authority responsible for the provision of local public 
transport and public transport operators. This will mean that the public authority can 
concentrate on pricing policy and the design of a proper remuneration scheme and 
leave the supply side to the operator. However, any long term contract should also 
contain clauses related to aspects of service quality that are not covered adequately by 
the remuneration scheme.  
 
Full scale performance contract in Hordaland County 
The principles indicated above was first applied in a model for Oslo Public Transport 
Company (Larsen 1999). OPTC is owned by the Municipality of Oslo and the close 
links between owner and operator not does constitute an ideal environment for an 
incentive contract. The agreement finally reached between the municipal authorities 
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and OPTC was far from a full scale incentive contract and did only partly adhere to 
the principles.  
 
In March 1999, Hordaland County Council decided that “the principle of quality 
contract” should form the basis for all contracts relating to public transport in 
Hordaland as from 1. January 20001. In this respect a “quality contract” signifies a 
incentive based contract, similar in principle to the scheme initially proposed in Oslo. 
There are some differences between Oslo and Hordaland that are important for the 
design of contracts.  
 
1. While the company involved in Oslo is owned by the municipality, there are three 
private companies providing services in Hordaland. One company (GAIA) 
operates in the City of Bergen and two regional companies2 operate commuting 
services to Bergen and rural and school services in the region.  
2. The initial level of subsidy was extremely biased in Hordaland. GAIA had 65 per 
cent of the passengers and 13 per cent of the subsidies. Our study showed that an 
optimum distribution of subsidies should reduce this imbalance. However, the 
financial constraints faced by Hordaland County would only allow for a minor 
adjustment.  
 
Using the model in Hordaland meant that the model had to be calibrated to each of the 
companies. This was considered an important task. In order to have confidence in the 
results produced by the model, all participants in the process should be able to 
recognise and relate to the results. They should also accept the key assumptions of the 
model with respect to unit costs, the distribution of revenue kilometres between basic 
and additional peak services and the distribution of passengers between categories 
(with school children as an additional category).  
 
Thus the initial work consisted finding a set of consistent assumption and parameters 
that was accepted both by the operators and county’s transport authority. An 
important check was that these inputs should make the model reproduce the 
benchmark situation (1999) with respect to passengers, fare revenue and cost. 
However, some allowance was made for the fact that the final figures for 1999 were 
still not known at that time.  
 
By the end of the calibration process the model produced the results in Table 1. The 
first four rows are estimates inputs (acceptable to all parties), while the remaining 
rows are results produced by the model and also accepted as accurate estimates of 
expected results for 1999 by the operators and the transport authority in Hordaland.  
 
We can see marked difference between GAIA that mainly serves the densely 
populated area of the City of Bergen and the three regional companies that operates 
long commuting routes to Bergen and also have a high share of school children as 
passengers.  
 
                                                 
1  Hordaland County in Western Norway includes the city of Bergen, and has a total population of 
about 450,000. 
2 The analysis was carried out for three regional companies, but two of them merged before our study 
was finalised.   
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While revenue kilometres in additional services amounts to 10 per cent of the basic 
services for GAIA the regional companies have percentages ranging from 29 to 56. 
By itself a high percentage of additional services tends to increase average cost per 
revenue kilometre. On the other hand, average speed is lower and unit costs are higher 
for GAIA than for the other companies. 
 
GAIA is by fare the largest company in terms of revenue kilometres and number of 
passengers, but average length of trips are shorter than for the regional companies.       
    
Table.1: Expected results for  1999 
 GAIA VEST BNR HSD 
Basic services , Mill rev. km/y   11.50 4.10 2.84 6.46 
Additional peak, Mill rev. km/y  1.39 1.98 1.58 1.89 
Revenue/pass.  ordinary  NOK 14.25 17.60 21.40 25.00 
Revenue/pass.  school    NOK 10.40 12.30 18.40 19.70 
Passengers (Mill/year):     
Category 1 pass. 4.9 1.81 0.52 0.68 
Category 2 pass. 2.5 0.60 0.17 0.23 
Category 3 pass. 14.0 2.98 0.68 1.44 
School children 1.5 1.07 0.80 1.65 
Total number of passengers 22.9 6.46 2.18 4.00 
Costs (Mill NOK/year)   352.2 153.8 87.7 153.7 
Fare revenue (Mill NOK/year) 320.5 107.9 44.2 91.3 
Deficit  (Mill NOK/year )  -31.7 -45.9 -43.5 -62.4 
Deficit in per cent of cost 9.0 29.9 49.6 40.6 
 
 
The model was initially run for all four operators with the “first best” assumptions in 
order to get an indication of the differences between fare and marginal cost for 
different categories of passengers. The results are shown in Figure 1. It is only for 
GAIA that the fare exceeds marginal cost for all categories of passengers. The 
regional companies seem to have substantial deficit for marginal commuting 
passengers. The main explanation is probably the substantial discounts for seasonal 
passes.   
 
The transport authority did not want to make any changes in the present level and 
structure of fares. An important argument in this respect was that the fare issue was 
politically very sensitive. Mixing a major revision of fares with the topic of contracts 
and incentive schemes could confound the political process. 
 
Consequently the model was run with the present fares to produce the optimum level 
of service subject to this constraint. A cost of public funds of 0.25 was also applied.  
 
Optimising the level of service with these constraints produced the results in Table 2.    
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Figur.1:Marginal cost per passenger for different categories and average fare.  
 
 
The results in Table 2 indicate that there should be a major expansion of basic 
services in GAIA and VEST. Subsidies to GAIA should be increased substantially 
while the regional operators should face a moderate reduction in deficit (subsidies). 
 
The initial low level of subsidies to GAIA probably reflects a regional bias in the 
County Council of Hordaland. It is a widespread opinion that subsidies to public 
transport are mainly needed in sparsely populated areas, while a minimum of 
subsidies would suffice for an urban area like Bergen. This is clearly a wrong 
assertion.  
  
Table .2: Optimum derived from maximising social surplus with present fares 
 GAIA VEST BNR HSD 
Basic services , Mill rev. km/y   20.51 7.92 1.91 4.58 
Additional peak, Mill rev. km/y  1.71 0.97 1.71 2.53 
Passengers (Mill/year):     
Category 1 pass. 5.4 1.72 0.52 0.69 
Category 2 pass. 2.7 0.57 0.17 0.23 
Category 3 pass. 17.3 3.89 0.55 1.20 
School children 1.5 1.07 0.80 1.65 
Total number of passengers 26.9 7.26 2.05 3.77 
Costs (Mill NOK/year)   495.6 168.9 74.3 137.3 
Fare revenue (Mill NOK/year) 378.1 121.9 41.4 85.6 
Deficit  (Mill NOK/year )  -117.5 -47.0 -32.9 -51.7 
Deficit in per cent of cost 23.7 27.8 43.1 37.7 
 
 
The next task is to design a remuneration scheme that induce the operators to produce 
approximately the same results as in Table 2 based on the objective of maximising 
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profit. An exact solution can probably be found by solving a set of simultaneous non-
linear equations based on the 1st order conditions for profit maximisation. However, 
we used a trial and error method. Starting from initial guesses and maximising profit, 
we adjusted the rates for revenue kilometres and peak passengers (Cat. 1) until the 
results in Table 3 were obtained. 
 
The level of service in Table 3 corresponds very closely to the level of service in 
Table 2 and the differences have insignificant impacts on social surplus (the basic 
objective). 
 
  
Table.3: Results with profit maximisation and remuneration scheme  
 GAIA VEST BNR HSD 
Remuneration:     
Per revenue km, basic         NOK  10,00 7,20 5,50 5,10 
Per revenue km, additional  NOK 18,00 12,00 10,00 9,00 
Per passenger, Cat. 1          NOK   0,00 0,00 10,00 9,00 
Level of service:     
Basic,  Mill rev.km per year 20,4 8,01 2,32 4,53 
Add. peak, Mill rev. km  per year 1,7 0,97 1,70 2,52 
Passengers (Mill/year):     
Cat 1 5,4 1,73 0,53 0,69 
Cat 2 2,7 0,58 0,18 0,23 
Cat 3 (off – peak) 17,3 3,91 0,61 1,19 
School children 1,5 1,07 0,80 1,65 
Passengers , total 26,9 7,29 2,11 3,77 
Costs,                      Mill NOK/year   496,0 170,2 77,9 136,9 
Fare revenue           Mill NOK/year 378,1 122,4 42,8 85,4 
Profits, excl. remun. Mill NOK/year  -117,9 -47,8 -35,0 -51,5 
Remuneration, basic    Mill NOK/y 203,6 57,7 12,7 23,1 
Remuneration, add. Mill NOK/year  31,1 11,6 17,0 22,8 
Remuneration, Cat 1    Mill NOK/y 0,0 0,0 5,3 6,2 
Total remuneration   Mill NOK/year 234,8 69,3 35,0 52,1 
Fixed deduction1)    Mill NOK/year -110,0 -20,0 0 0 
Total subsidies        Mill NOK/year 124,8 49,3 35,0 52,1 
Profits 6,9 1,5 -0,03 0,6 
1) Our suggestion 
 
 
 
In order to get satisfactory results BNR and HSD needed a remuneration per peak 
passenger (Cat. 1) while GAIA and VEST could do without. The explanation is to be 
found in Figure 1. The big difference between average fare and marginal cost for Cat. 
1 passengers for BNR and HSD makes it unprofitable to operate additional 
commuting services in the peak even with the remuneration per revenue kilometre 
estimated in Table 3. Increasing this remuneration without compensation for the 
difference between fare and marginal cost introduces other kinds of distortions.     
 
The remuneration rates suggested by Table 3 will result in excessive profits for GAIA 
and VEST. A normal rate of return on capital is already included in the cost function. 
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Thus to avoid excessive subsidies we have suggested fixed deductions of NOK 110 
Mill and NOK 20 Mill for GAIA and VEST respectively in Table 3.  
 
The model is formulated in terms of revenue kilometres. This is mainly for 
convenience because it allows for the same units to be used both in the demand and in 
the cost functions. Differences between operators when it comes to unit cost per 
revenue kilometre can to a great extent be explained by differences in average speed 
for routes operated. Serving mainly a densely populated urban area, GAIA has the 
lowest average speed.  
 
A more general remuneration scheme should use a combination of remuneration per 
revenue kilometre and revenue vehicle hour. In Table 4 the rates in Table 3 have been 
split between kilometres and hours. We see that the differences between operators 
now become much smaller.     
 
Table .4: Remuneration rates  based on revenue kilometres and vehicle hours, NOK  
 Per revenue 
kilometre 
Per rev. vehicle 
hour, basic 
Per rev. vehicle 
hour, additional  
Per Category 1 
passenger 
GAIA 3,50 130 300 0 
VEST 2,50 130 250 0 
BNR 1,50 130 250 10 
HSD 1,50 130 250 9 
 
 
The rates in Table 4 have formed the basis for the economic incentives included in the 
new contracts in Hordaland County. While being an important ingredient in the 
contracts they are only part of the story.   
 
This paper focuses on the method that was used to come up with estimates of the rates 
that should be applied in the incentive scheme. Carlquist (2001) gives a more 
elaborate presentation of the actual contracts implemented and the experience gained 
so far. 
 
Summary and conclusion 
Assuming that a public transport operator familiar with a geographical area also 
posses the best knowledge of the market for public transport in the area and the cost 
of operating a system of routes in the area, this knowledge should be used to its best 
advantage. Lacking a compelling reason for thinking in other terms, we may also 
assume that the objective for the design of a public transport system is to maximise 
social surplus.  
 
Given these assumption there is much to be said for an organisational form that allows 
for a regulated monopolist that faces economic incentives that makes the result of 
profit maximisation coincide with a social optimum when it comes to the level of 
service.  
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This idea has been used within the framework of a formal model and the results show 
that a proper remuneration scheme can be constructed to this end. A precondition for 
this approach to work is that the operators initially are performing efficiently. 
Otherwise a model calibrated on data from an actual operator may come up with 
excessive rates of remuneration.  
 
In Hordaland County the model has been used to come up remuneration rates that 
have formed the basis for contracts. The operators in Hordaland County have for a 
decade been subject to hard pressures to reduce costs and there is by now no 
indication of poor X-efficiency. A modelling approach can therefor be used with 
some confidence.  
 
The case of Hordaland represents the first example of a (near) full scale 
implementation of incentive based contract that relies so heavily on theoretical 
considerations and the experience gained there should be monitored carefully.  
 
Apart from demonstrating a novel approach, the most remarkable aspect of the 
Hordaland case is in my opinion that local authorities have put so much faith in the 
experts and their abstract modelling. On the other hand, it also takes some courage on 
part of the experts to from abstract principles to very specific and detailed 
recommendations.    
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